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1. Introduction  
This study examines the perception of corporate governance (CG) practitioners on CG 
implementation process, regulatory compliance and firm performance in three emerging 
countries – Cameroon, Kenya and Pakistan. Despite being home to a majority of the global 
population, emerging economies have only received consideration within governance and 
general management literature within the last decade (Alawattage and Wickramasinghe, 2007; 
Tsamenyi et al., 2007, Waweru, 2014). It is therefore unsurprising that much is yet to be known 
about the practice of CG within many emerging economies (Okike, 2007; Adegbite et al., 2013; 
Waweru, 2014).  A recent review of CG studies by Coumo et al., (2016), shows that the last 
decade witnessed an increase in academic research on compliance with CG codes in emerging 
economies. But studies using cross-country samples especially through a qualitative method 
are absent. This suggests that cross country studies uncovering the “voice” and behaviour of 
CG practitioners vis-à-vis the dynamic and complex nature of country-level institutions and 
CG regulations has been overlooked within extant literature. 
 
This paper fills this lacuna through a comparative analysis that uncovers the divergence 
and/or convergence of CG systems operational in three emerging economies (Cameroon, 
Kenya and Pakistan) while highlighting different contextual impacts on behaviour of 
practitioners in these economies. Drawing from a combination of critical realist perspective 
and new institutional economics theory (NIE), we explore the perception of CG practitioners 
concerning CG implementation process, regulatory compliance and the impact of CG on firm 
performance in Cameroon, Kenya and Pakistan. Consequently, we draw on practitioner 
accounts gathered through semi-structured interviews to examine the drivers and/or inhibitors 
of CG practices in these emerging economies. We contend that CG regulatory requirements 
directly impacts on practitioner behaviour and roles across national, firm and board levels. The 
choice of qualitative methodology in this study is also intended to contribute to CG research 
that is specific to the culture and institutional realities of emerging economies contexts 
(McNulty et al. 2013). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first large-scale comparative 
qualitative study (using three distinct emerging economies) examining how CG practitioners 
rationalise CG regulations together with how this is influenced by peculiarities of individual 
countries institutional environment. 
 
Accordingly, extant individual country studies have documented largely negative 
perceptions concerning CG implementation by practitioners in various emerging economies 
including Nigeria (Okike, 2007; Angaye and Gwilliam 2008), Malaysia (Liew, 2007, 2008), 
Mauritius (Soobaroyen and Sheik-Ellahi, 2008), Kenya (ROSC Kenya, 2010) and Bangladesh 
(Uddin and Choudhury, 2008). These papers postulates that modifying the provisions of 
international CG codes adopted within emerging economies, may promote their effectiveness 
leading to minimal conflicts with demands of local institutional environments. This is because 
some institutions such as culture are powerful forces, which might be difficult to change and 
or may take longer periods to undergo change (Zucker, 1977).  However, these prior studies 
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are country specific, which limits overall comparison and applicability across other emerging 
economies. We extend these prior studies through a comparative examination of practitioner 
perceptions of CG implementation process across different emerging market economic 
institutions. We contend that there is a need to explore perceptions of CG practitioners with 
regard to governance implementation through a multi-country study. This, we argue, has 
potential to provide a comprehensive understanding of CG practices and adoption across 
different countries economic institutions. This thus leads to the development of the first 
research question for this study: How do CG practitioners perceive the implementation of CG 
regulations in Cameroon, Kenya and Pakistan? 
The level of compliance with CG regulations varies across countries and regions 
depending on formal and informal institutions (Al-Bassam et al., 2018; Mahadeo, and 
Soobaroyen). Specifically, and regarding CG compliance, western economies (e.g. UK and 
USA) are found to have higher compliance levels when compared with emerging economies 
(Coumo et al., 2016). However, majority of research on CG compliance levels are mainly 
quantitative in nature. Notwithstanding, there is a dearth of research which explores 
practitioners account on why CG compliance levels are generally low within emerging 
economies. A notable conceptual issue within prior research as noted by Coumo et al., (2016) 
and Elghuweel et al., (2018) is the inadequacy in exploring the role of the national institutional 
environment on firm level behavior.  These limitations of prior research lead to the second 
research question for this study: How do CG practitioners in Cameroon, Kenya and Pakistan 
perceive the levels of CG compliance, including factors which constrain CG compliance 
within their countries? 
 
Furthermore, evidence concerning the impact of CG on firm performance is mixed. 
Some authors have suggested that CG has a positive impact on firm performance (see, for 
example, Bhagat and Boltan, 2008; Abor, 2007; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Gompers et al., 
2003; Claessens and Fan, 2002). However, other researchers have reported negative and/or 
insignificant relationship between CG and firm financial performance (e.g. Kyereboah-
Coleman and Biekpe ,2006, and Sanda et al., 2010). The lack of consistent results has been 
attributed to varying econometric methods employed by different authors, use of different 
measurement proxies, or overreliance on quantitative methodology (McNulty et al. 2013).  In 
the context of emerging economies, some authors (e.g. Pistor 2002) have argued CG 
implementation may not improve efficiency or improve firm performance. As argued by Pistor 
(2002), for CG regulations to be effective in improving firm outcomes, such regulations must 
be fully understood, accepted and practiced by their consumers (i.e. CG practitioners). The 
present paper argues that the perspectives of governance practitioners may assist in overcoming 
the limitation of inconclusive findings within CG scholarship. Specifically, we argue that the 
way CG practitioners perceive CG regulations potentially affects CG implementation and its 
effectiveness in improving firm performance. For example, practitioners who value CG 
regulations will adopt recommended practices, which subsequently improves performance. 
However, where CG regulation is perceived as intrusive or irrelevant, practitioners may resist 
its implementation. This potentially explain the negative or insignificant CG-firm performance 
link reported by some authors. Drawing from this, we examine the perception of CG 
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practitioners with regards to the effectiveness of CG in improving firm performance. This leads 
to our third research question: How and in what ways do CG practitioners perceived the 
effectiveness of CG in improving firm performance in Cameroon, Kenya and Pakistan? 
 
Using 24 practitioner accounts across Cameroon, Kenya and Pakistan, we document 
the following key findings. First, CG implementation is nascent and still very slow across the 
three countries. Practitioners’ accounts suggest that there is general reluctance to adhere and 
implement “good” CG across all three countries. Practitioners suggest this is because CG did 
not emanate locally and thus firms resist implementation of what is perceived as “foreign 
rules”. They opine that CG implementation is a result of foreign pressure from international 
bodies rather than local initiatives. Second, with respect to CG regulatory compliance, 
practitioners observed that organizations attempt to comply with CG provisions not because 
they see the relevance of CG regulations, but because they are enshrined in law (e.g. listing 
requirements and company laws). We find that Kenyan and Pakistani firms adhere to CG 
regulations to avoid hefty fines and penalties for non-compliance. In Cameroon, however, CG 
regulation is not strictly enforced and thus CG implementation is less visible. Thirdly, we find 
mixed accounts regarding the impact of CG on firm performance. While some respondents 
across the three studied countries indicated that CG impacts positively on firm performance, 
others indicated a negative and/or no direct link. This divergence in practitioner perspectives 
is explained by the value relevance they attach to CG.  
 
Drawing on the above findings, this paper makes several contributions to existing 
literature. First, we expand empirical literature on diffusion of international CG models by 
uncovering the divergence and convergence of CG systems operational in emerging markets 
while highlighting different institutional influences on behavior of CG practitioners in these 
economies. Specifically, we show ineffectiveness in CG implementation in emerging 
economies is due to lack of institutional identify and ownership of recommended CG 
regulations. There is unwillingness in implementation across countries partly due to low 
enforcement by regulators and/or due to perception of value irrelevance by various CG 
practitioners. Second, this study adopts a cross-country approach in order to enhance 
applicability of research findings reached. As Wanyama et al. (2009) notes, CG scholars whose 
‘empirical evidence’ spans more than one country potentially reach findings which are 
conclusive, and highly applicable in other similar contexts. Thirdly, the study utilises a 
qualitative approach to enhance ‘insights and discovery’ of CG practitioners’ perspectives 
within each of the three countries (Bluhm et al., 2011). Lastly, this study carries important 
implications for policy and practice of CG within emerging economies contexts. Specifically, 
the lack of CG identity and ownership leads to symbolic compliance, which may be improved 
by considering wider participation of local CG practitioners in designing a localized code of 
CG practices. Policy makers within emerging economies should also ensure that CG 
regulations are adapted to the realities of prevailing institutional environments of each country. 
 
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the contexts of the 
three studied countries – Cameroon, Kenya and Pakistan. Section 3 provides a review of 
literature and theoretical foundations underpinning this paper. Section 4 outlines the data and 
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research methods. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Finally, section 6 summarises and 
concludes the study. 
2. The background of corporate governance in Cameroon, Kenya and Pakistan 
The three countries – Cameroon, Kenya and Pakistan – form ideal contexts for analysing the 
perceptions of CG practitioners within emerging markets, on account of their rich and 
diverse institutional environments (Rahman et al., 2013). Accordingly, the perceptions of 
CG practitioners along with CG practices are likely to be defined by peculiarities of the 
respective country environments (Aguilera, 2005; Adegbite and Nakajima, 2012; Adegbite 
et al., 2013). 
First, Cameroon has a unique mix of English common law origin and the French civil 
law system. This Anglo-French legal arrangement offers an ideal case for analysing the 
extent to which such combination impacts on CG practices, along with whether the 
perceptions of CG practitioners in Cameroon are influenced to a large extent by either the 
English, or, the French heritage. Also, Cameroon’s stock market – the Douala Stock 
Exchange – is fairly recent, having been established in the year 2001. The law regulating CG 
activities in Cameroon is contained within the OHADA (Organization for Harmonization of 
Business Law in Africa) company law. The OHADA law, adopted in 1993, and was 
developed to provide a uniform regulation for corporations within the Central African 
Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC). The OHADA law follows somewhat a mix 
of Anglo-American and the Continental Europe CG models due to Cameroon’s heritage of 
English common law and French civil law systems. A significant provision of the OHADA 
law, and which is also consistent with the Anglo-American governance model, is the control 
of agency problems, which might arise from the separation of ownership and control within 
firms. However, as most businesses within the CEMAC region tend to have no clear 
separation of ownership and control, the OHADA allows firms with less than three owners 
to have same individuals serving as both CEO and board chair (Dickerson 2007). 
Conversely, whilst the OHADA law contains provisions for safeguarding CG, studies 
conducted by the World Bank (2006) and (GIZ 2013) indicate that rampant corruption still 
hampers good CG practices in Cameroon.  
On the other hand, Kenya’s CG code is modelled along the Anglo-American 
governance framework. Kenya’s current CG code, the guidelines on corporate governance 
by public listed companies in Kenya, was adopted in the year 2002 after persuasion from the 
Bretton Woods Institutions (Mwaura, 2007; Musikali, 2008). This followed from attempts 
by the IMF, to advocate the privatisation of state-owned enterprises in order to enhance 
efficiency in their operations and control corruption within Kenya’s corporate sector 
(Mwaura, 2007). In addition, the introduction of CG regulations had been viewed as a 
remedy for the costly banking sector crises, which had troubled Kenya’s economy between 
mid-1980s and 1990s (Brownbridge, 1998). There are currently 65 companies listed at 
Kenya’s only stock market, the Nairobi Securities Exchange. In addition to the CG code, the 
Kenyan corporate sector is regulated by the Kenya Companies Act, Chapter 486, Laws of 
Kenya (Barako et al. 2006).  
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Finally, Pakistan also has an Anglo-American-based CG code of practice. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) introduced this code in 2002, 
which is also the primary regulator for the corporate sector in Pakistan. The CG code of 
Pakistan is part of the continuous listing requirements for listed Pakistani firms. Notably, 
whereas the CG code in Pakistan assumes a ‘comply or explain’ approach, SECP anticipates 
making the CG regulations mandatory once the country achieves a higher awareness of CG 
(Hamid and Kozhich, 2007). This decision is informed by the resistance and objection from 
the business community in Pakistan when the CG code was first introduced (The World 
Bank, 2005). In this regard, the business community cited among their reasons for the 
resistance as: (a) unavailability of sufficiently skilled individuals to assist in the 
implementation of the CG code; (b) fear that disclosure requirements might expose 
proprietary information to their business competitors; and (c) failure to see the benefits 
associated with compliance (International Finance Corporation, 2007). Indeed, some 
companies delisted from the Karachi Stock Exchange after the introduction of the CG code 
(Hamid and Kozhich, 2007). This may be explained from the fact that Pakistan adopted the 
CG code due to pressures from international financial agencies. According to Javid and Iqbal 
(2010), the Asian Development Bank offered technical assistance to incentivise Pakistan to 
adopt CG, while the World Bank further provided support in areas of training and 
development. 
Consequently, given the combination of differences and similarities of the institutional 
contexts across the three countries above, our study seeks to investigate the perception of 
key CG practitioners concerning CG implementation process, regulatory compliance and 
firm performance. The three countries – Cameroon, Kenya and Pakistan – were selected as 
they offer interesting exemplification of contextual diversity of emerging economies. 
Accordingly, the contextual backgrounds of these countries share similar institutional 
features such as comparable stages of socio-economic development including high poverty 
levels (The World Bank, 2016), weak legal and regulatory frameworks (Musikali, 2008; 
Javid and Robina, 2010), political interference in the corporate sectors and political 
instability, as well as corruption and bribery (Mwaura, 2007; Javid and Robina, 2010; GIZ, 
2013; Kaymak and Bektas, 2015). Other commonalities include: a shared legal background 
– English common law – in the three countries; similar cultural and traditional (African) 
values between Cameroon and Kenya. Conversely, the three countries also exhibit 
noticeable contrasts within their social and legal contexts. For instance, Pakistan has a unique 
religious and cultural background from the other two countries – Cameroon and Kenya. 
Additionally, Cameroon has a distinct legal background compared with Kenya and Pakistan, 
as the former has a combination of English common law and French civil law systems. 
It is against this background, that the combination of these three countries captures the 
contextual similarities and differences that exist across many emerging economies. 
Consequently, the findings from this study provide a representative understanding 
concerning the practices of borrowed western CG practices and their applicability in 
emerging economies contexts. 
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3.0 Literature review  
3.1 Interface between critical realism and new institutional economics (NIE) theoretical 
framework 
As opined by Roberts et al. (2005), research, practice and reforms in the field of CG have 
been largely developed under the influence of agency theory. While agency theory points 
out the problems originating from the separation of ownership and control, it focuses on the 
protection of shareholder rights from self-interested managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Fama, 1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). To resolve these problems CG reforms, such as 
Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002, introduced such governance mechanisms as board independence 
and accountability.  
In contrast, however, several researchers argue that the traditional model of agency is 
appropriate for well-developed and efficient capital markets but cannot be suitably applied 
to markets in developing countries characterized by concentrated ownership (Young et al., 
2008; Gilson, 2007, Yusuf et al., Forthcoming). These researchers argue that in an 
institutional context characterized by concentrated ownership, there is no real separation 
between ownership and control, rendering such governance arrangements ineffective in such 
a context (Fan and Wong, 2002; Hoffman et al., 2016). 
The above discussion indicates that to analyse response towards the implementation 
of CG regulations in developing countries, we must consider the institutional and socio-
political contexts of these countries. To allow such an analysis, we adopt the critical realism 
stance. Accordingly, we accept the existence of such normative ‘structures, mechanisms and 
processes’ as institutions, utility functions, opportunism, and self-interest. We further 
acknowledge that the actions of individuals are influenced by underlying social (normative) 
structures, and that these structures can constrain or facilitate human actions (Mcevoy and 
Richards, 2006). On the other hand, however, we argue that these normative structures are 
affected by the perceptions of social actors, human agency and social mechanisms. In this 
regard, we posit that reality in management and social research is a result of the perceptions 
of social actors and is thus socially constructed (Bhaskar, 1978). Critical realism permits us 
to appreciate that the subjective interpretations of social actors are affected by existence of 
underlying causal mechanisms. Critical realism further permits a critical analysis of an 
unequal distribution of power between international funding bodies, regulatory 
organisations, governments of developing countries and corporate organisations. In order to 
develop an in-depth understanding of the evidence collected, we used New Institutional 
Economics (NIE) framework proposed by Williamson (1998). Table 1 below provides an 
overview of our conceptualisation and customisation of the model proposed by Williamson 
(1998). 
[Insert Table 1 here: Economics of institutions: adaptation of NIE framework for Cameroon, 
Kenya and Pakistan] 
The first level of the framework, called the level of ‘social embeddedness’, illustrates 
the influence of social, cultural, political and mental norms and traditions on people and 
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institutions. Williamson (1998) asserts that institutions at this level arise spontaneously and 
society may take from 100 to 1000 years to adopt any outside values and traditions. At the 
second level of the framework, that is, ‘institutional environment’, society may introduce 
formal legislations, such as property rights enforcement laws and national constitutions. The 
instruments that operate at this level include legislative, executive, judicial and other laws. 
At this level, the institutional environment is developed strongly in alignment with first level 
institutions, so that it sets the foundation for the third level of social analysis. In Pakistan, 
Kenya and Cameroon, level 2 institutions were not developed in alignment with level 1 
institutions, rather they were developed under British and French influence. The third level 
of analysis, that is, ‘governance’ involves the introduction of a well-functioning system for 
defining and enforcing contract law. Governance structures are used as a tool for bringing 
order and resolving conflicts between parties to involved in business transactions. CG 
structures in all the countries under study were introduced at this level. However, as 
discussed earlier, these regulations may not be suitable for implementation in the context of 
emerging economies. We contend that these regulations might be perceived as ‘foreign’ in 
the context of these countries, thus affecting their acceptance and subsequent 
implementation. The fourth level of analysis is labelled as ‘resource allocation and 
employment’. This level relates to agency theory perspective and explains economic 
outcomes of organisation within prevailing institutional environment and governance 
structures. 
The discussion above suggests that there is potentially a lack of alignment between 
CG regulations and institutional environments of the three studied countries. In view of this, 
we postulate that CG regulations may fail to reach acceptance by various CG practitioners in 
these countries. This might therefore render CG regulations and implementation efforts 
ineffective. Accordingly, we contend that, if CG regulations implemented in these countries 
do not align with the realities of their institutional environments, such regulations risk losing 
the support of CG practitioners. Consequently, little if any impact of CG on firm performance 
is likely to be experienced. We opine that any considerable level of adoption of CG regulations 
by practitioners can only be achieved through coercive pressures from the CG regulators 
(Areneke and Kimani 2018). 
 
3.2 Review of corporate governance research in emerging economies contexts 
It is apparent from Williamson (1998) NIE framework and the literature on CG research 
within emerging economies that perceived ‘good’ CG regulations may not automatically lead 
to the desired CG practices (Okike, 2007; Wanyama et al., 2009; Adegbite and Nakajima, 
2012; Adegbite et al., 2013; Waweru, 2014). The main reason for this divergence between the 
expectations and/or assumptions of the CG codes and the actual CG practices, might be 
attributed to powerful contextual factors at Level 1 and Level 2 of Williamson’s framework 
discussed in the preceding section. These factors are responsible for constraining the actions 
of individuals involved in the CG process – the CG practitioners in Level 3 (Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2010; Adegbite and Nakajima, 2012; Adegbite et al., 2013). Such factors are also 
argued to exist at both the country level, as well as the industry/firm levels (Judge, 2012). For 
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this reason, it is important to begin CG research by first considering how CG practitioners 
make sense of CG process (Ndiweni, 2008; Soobaroyen and Sheik-Ellahi, 2008; Soobaroyen 
and Mahadeo, 2012, Kimani et al., 2015). This is argued to be a useful pointer to the contextual 
factors, which have more influence, relative to others, on the firm CG activities within a 
country (Laetza et al., 2008; Wanyama et al., 2009). 
Existing literature has documented negative perceptions of CG practitioners in various 
emerging economies. Okike (2007), for instance, found that shareholders in Nigeria elicited 
negative views about the effectiveness of CG regulations due to the rampant levels of 
corruption in the country. Okike (2007) suggests that the CG code adopted in Nigeria ought 
to be modified to control corporate corruption among other contextual challenges, for 
shareholders to be able to have confidence in the CG process. Similarly, Liew (2007) 
conducted ten semi-structured interviews with leading CG players in Malaysia and found that 
they regarded CG from a social perspective as opposed to the shareholder viewpoint 
underpinning the Anglo-American governance model implemented in Malaysia. Liew (2007) 
attributed the perspectives of these CG practitioners to an influential cultural background. 
Thus Liew (2007) concluded that the Anglo-American governance model adopted in Malaysia 
is unlikely to achieve effectiveness unless there is a change in corporate culture. Perhaps the 
quickest way to safeguard the effectiveness of CG in Malaysia would involve the modification 
of the CG code to fit with the prevailing cultural environment. This is because some 
institutions such as culture are powerful forces, which might be difficult to change, or may 
take a very long period to undergo change (Zucker, 1977). 
Angaye and Gwilliam (2008) utilised documentary data and semi-structured 
interviews with a view to analysing how CG players make sense about the nature, meaning, 
and practice of CG in Nigeria. They concluded that culture greatly determines the meaning, 
which CG practitioners attach to it. In another study, Liew (2008) further used a mix of 
documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews with 19 CG practitioners. Liew (2008) 
found that CG practitioners perceive ‘good’ CG to benefit their firms through ensuring that 
managers remain professional, hence reducing agency problems. We expect such a positive 
perception of CG to act as an incentive for firms to enhance their CG practices. A similar 
study conducted in Mauritius by Soobaroyen and Sheik-Ellahi (2008) sought to understand 
firm managers’ perception of CG. Interestingly, these writers found that different managers 
attached varied meanings to the notion of CG, including shareholder-based views as well as 
stakeholder-based meanings. This therefore evidences that CG is potentially a contested topic. 
ROSC Kenya (2010) examined how the standards of accounting and auditing operate in 
Kenya and found that, some CG practitioners misunderstood or held misperceptions 
concerning the CG process. For instance, the report revealed that some managers engaged the 
same auditors both to prepare and audit their company’s financial statements. This is a conflict 
of interests, that is, accountants auditing the same financial statements, which they prepared. 
Accordingly, the ROSC Kenya (2010) notes that investigating the perceptions of such CG 
players helps to understand whether they clearly understand the CG requirements, as well as 
whether some form of training might be necessary. Uddin and Choudhury (2008) also argued 
that implementation of an Anglo-American CG model is not suitable in the institutional 
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context of Bangladesh. Based on the review of relevant existing literature, we contend that 
CG practitioners in developing countries have not accepted implementation of CG and 
consequently they will have negative perceptions about the introduction and implementation 
of these guidelines in Kenya, Cameroon and Pakistan.   
Coumo et al., (2016) note that the level of compliance with country level CG codes 
varies enormously across economies. Their review shows that western economies (e.g. UK 
and USA) are achieving higher compliance levels with CG regulations whereas emerging 
economies score very low. However, since most studies on compliance with CG regulations 
are generally quantitative in nature, there is a dearth of research, which explores why 
emerging economies fail to comply with CG regulations. In addition, inconsistent 
compliance-firm performance relations have been attributed to both conceptual and 
methodological problems (Coumo et al., 2016, pp.235).  A notable conceptual issue within 
prior research as noted by Coumo et al., (2016) is the inadequacy in exploring the role of the 
national institutional environment on firm level behavior. According to Williamson (1998) 
NIE framework, the strength of Level 2 institutions (judiciary, bureaucracy and legal 
institutions) determines how well Level 3 (governance) may perform. Drawing inspiration 
from the limitations of prior research, this research utilises Williamson (1998) NIE framework 
to investigate CG compliance practices using international/cross country samples and evaluate 
their bearing on managerial behavior. We contend that if CG practitioners do not accept 
implementation of CG in these countries, the level of compliance with these regulations is 
likely to be poor. 
There is plenty of research advocating for the positive impact of CG mechanisms on 
firm performance (see, for example, Bhagat and Boltan, 2008; Brown  and Caylor, 2006; 
Gompers et al., 2003; Claessens and Fan, 2002; Abor, 2007). Siddiqui (2010), however, studied 
the context of Bangladesh and argued that in the context of developing countries, 
implementation of CG regulations may not improve efficiency. As discussed earlier, in the 
context of developing countries, CG regulations are considered ‘foreign’ regulations which do 
not have any alignment with Level 1 institutions in the economy, while Level 2 institutions are 
also very weak and are unable to support governance institutions. As argued by Pistor (2002), 
in order for a best practices regulation to be effective in changing outcomes, they must be fully 
understood, accepted and practiced by CG practitioners. Therefore, we contend that despite the 
presence of some positive academic evidence on the effectiveness of CG regulations, an 
investigation is warranted concerning how CG practitioners in developing countries perceive 
the effectiveness ‘foreign’ CG regulations in improving firm performance. We propose that 
since CG regulations in these countries might not be accepted by CG practitioners, it may lead 
to ineffective compliance. 
 
Building from the extant research discussed above, as well as the highlighted gaps in 
the literature, this paper seeks to contribute to fill the dearth in comparative emerging 
economies CG research by exploring the perceived hindrances to effective CG implementation 
from a comparative angle with rich contextual data from Cameroon, Kenya, and Pakistan.  In 
addition, the present paper explores the perceptions of CG practitioners concerning the 
effectiveness of CG regulations within these countries as well as how CG practitioners perceive 
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the role of “good” CG on firm financial performance. As Jackling & Joh (2009) noted, there is 
paucity of qualitative research in understanding the extent of the applicability of CG practices 
emanating from industrialised economies and imposed on emerging economies. This research 
thus aims to address this gap. The present study further aims to disabuse the notion that all 
emerging economies have homogenous institutional environments, and also show why 
implying that there is a ‘one-size-fit-all’ model of CG practices may be a flawed assumption. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Data collection and sample 
Majority of studies in CG in developed economies have used a quantitative methodology to 
examine CG practices. However, the outcome of such research has often been conflicting 
empirical results (Kumar and Zattoni, 2015; McNulty et al., 2013). Within emerging 
economies, the trend of CG research has also taken this route (examples of such studies 
include, Alnabsha et al., 2018; Agyemang et al. 2015; Ntim, 2013; Abor and Fiador, 2013; 
Mangena et al., 2012). Our study however departs from this methodological trend by 
collecting rich qualitative data through semi-structured interviews and field notes. Our 
choice of qualitative data through in-depth interviews is incentivized by limited comparative 
contextual qualitative research aimed at understanding CG constructs in emerging 
economies, where CG issues are still developing. Within emerging economies, their 
institutional contexts are predictably different from those observed in developed economies 
were CG originates (Young et al. 2008, Kimani et al., 2015). Accordingly, the institutional 
contexts of emerging countries make agency contracts’ problematic due to institutional 
environments which do not lend themselves to application of international best practices on 
CG (Young et al. 2008, Yusuf et al., Forthcoming). We contend that examining CG issues 
within emerging economies from a quantitative methodological viewpoint, limits richness in 
understanding the features of CG practices in these countries. It is for this reason that the 
present paper adopts a qualitative research with relevant CG practitioners. More so, our study 
also responds to calls for methodological pluralism in CG research (Kumar and Zattoni, 
2015; McNulty et al., 2013; Young et al., 2008). In fact, a review of CG studies by McNulty 
et al. (2013) showed that between 1986 to 2011, only 78 qualitative articles have been written 
around CG and was conducted mostly within developed economies. Our study further 
incorporates extensive field research with various CG practitioners in order to better 
understand and document CG practices in each country (Ahrens et al., 2011). We believe 
that this methodological choice contributes immensely in understanding CG issues within 
relatively under-studied research contexts. 
As noted above, our study used primarily open-ended semi- structured interviews to 
collect rich data from CG practitioners in Cameroon, Kenya and Pakistan. Our choice of 
open-ended in-depth semi-structured interviews was guided by the need to understand 
perceptions of CG practitioners in engaging with CG practices in these countries. Semi-
structured interviews arguably were more suited than any other research technique as this 
enabled the researchers to probe interesting insights from various CG practitioners. This 
method of data collection as noted by Young & Thyil (2014, pp.5) as more appropriate than 
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other methods when dealing with complex social issues which involves reflective individuals 
who make economic decisions in the real world, and with the choices they make being 
contingent on their institutional context and business environment. Following from this, the 
method allowed the researchers to obtain information regarding the historical emergence of 
CG and its implementation process, the regulatory enforcement and effectiveness of CG 
laws. More so, the on-site nature of the research (as interviews were conducted face-face in 
Cameroon, Kenya and Pakistan) enabled the development of an understanding of the 
institutional ‘context’ within which firms operate in the respective countries. Furthermore, 
open-ended semi-structured interviews also allowed the researchers to gain interesting 
insights and elicit in-depth information due to its flexibility (which other methods such as 
structured interviews or surveys do not possess) and collect field and observatory notes 
during interviews. 
To develop the interview questions for the study, we first analyzed company annual 
reports to see the level of CG disclosures. We triangulated annual report information with 
newspaper articles, releases from company websites, government documents, legal 
documents as well as websites of international organizations such as World Bank and IMF.   
This was done by respective researchers for each country. This was followed by a 
comparison of possible areas of enquiry as developed by each researcher from the respective 
countries. This comparison led to development of a list of interview questions which 
captured similar CG concepts and issues across Cameroon, Kenya and Pakistan. These 
questions were further piloted with a board member from each country. Based on this initial 
feedback, the final questions were further refined to ensure personalised approach in 
conducting interviews.  
Evidence from the study was collected from twenty-four CG practitioners in the period 
2012-2014. The researchers contacted more than 20 participants in each country to 
participate in the research.  However, because of availability challenges and time constraints 
on the part of the respondents, the three researchers successfully conducted 8 semi-structured 
interviews with CG practitioners in each country as these researchers had knowledge of, and 
networks within, their respective home countries. All interviews were audio recorded except 
for Cameroon where a director preferred not to be recorded in which case the researcher took 
notes. The participant who refused audio recording gave personal reasons not related to the 
research as the reason for refusal. The choice of eight interviews ensured that data saturation 
was reached in each country (see Guest et al., 2006). In our study, we found that all the 
themes were present after the first four interviews and reoccurred in each successive 
interview across the three studied countries. Moreover, our selection of eight interviews from 
each country exceeds Guest et al.’s (2006) recommendation of six interviews for a qualitative 
research such as ours. More so, given the difficulty in accessing primary data from targeted 
CG practitioners (e.g. the board of directors) as they are known to conduct business in secret 
(Minichilli et al. 2009, Pettigrew 1992), and do not like to give out company information, 
our sample size for the study is acceptable to understand the CG constructs investigated in 
this research. Appendix 1 provides more details and profiles of the research participants 
involved in this study. 
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The selection of twenty-four CG practitioners who participated in the research was 
based on individual practitioners’ wealth of knowledge and experience in the study topic, 
willingness to contribute to the research, representativeness of the sample and the availability 
of both the CG practitioners and the researchers. In each country, the sample consisted of 
seven males and one female respondent. Each of the CG practitioners in the study held key 
positions in a firm or a regulatory body. All the CG practitioners hold positions such as, 
executive directors, CEO, finance director, compliance/regulatory director, board chairman 
and company secretary. In addition, they all have experience ranging from 5 - 35 years. 
Interviewees were given an opportunity to select the location they felt comfortable in holding 
the interview, all research participants were interviewed at their places of work, that is, either 
their offices or a boardroom. Twenty- three interviews took place in the offices of the 
participants and one in a boardroom. All interviews were conducted in English and lasted for 
an average of 60 minutes. The first round of interviews took place between February – May 
2012 comprising of 8 interviews across organizations in Pakistan operating in the finance, oil 
and gas, mining, regulatory and related institutions. The second round of interviews in Kenya 
comprised 8 CG practitioners from finance, industrial, basic material and agricultural 
organizations in the period February -May 2013. Finally, the last set of interviews were 
conducted between April-July 2014 and consisted of 8 interviews in Cameroon with 
participants drawn from the agro-industry, oil and gas, mining, finance, whole sale and retail, 
and transport, storage and communication industries. In all the three rounds of interviews, 
three different authors who are familiar with the contextual environments of each of these 
countries conducted the interviews. As noted above, digital audio recorders were used during 
the interview process and later transcribed and shared with each researcher to assist in 
safeguarding reliability of the data analysis process. This practice also enabled the researchers 
to ensure consistency in data analysis and interpretation, subsequently enhancing the 
robustness of the findings reached. 
5. Empirical findings 
5.1 Corporate governance implementation process 
The analysis of interview data revealed that the process of introduction and implementation of 
CG regulations is inert in all three countries. Table 2 outlines the responses from various 
interviews from the three countries. The last column of the table provides interpretation by the 
researchers to draw insightful conclusions.  
[Insert Table 2 here – corporate governance is a foreign concept] 
 
To begin with, respondents from Cameroon and Kenya asserted that CG regulations 
are still at an infancy stage of implementation. For instance, a CEO from Cameroon stated; 
“It’s still embryonic, rudimentary at best because this is a concept that is gaining grounds 
but it’s taking, perhaps much longer because the sensitisation process, to me, is a bit slow” 
(CG1CAM, Cameroon) 
One of the respondents from Kenya insisted; 
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“Historically, we did not have CG…this thing is still in the nascent stages with many people 
gradually implementing it” (CG2KEN, Kenya) 
Respondents from Pakistan, however, stated that although firms in Pakistan were 
reluctant to adopt CG immediately after the introduction of the CG code in 2002, however, 
overtime, firms are adapting to the requirements. Another director accounts; 
“All the companies were facing difficulties in implementing the different requirements of the 
code of corporate governance. But as it is grown up now [has developed], the companies are 
adapting to it” (CG1PAK, Pakistan). 
The responses from all three countries indicate an initial unwillingness to adopt CG 
reforms within the business community in these countries, which is in alignment with the 
findings from previous research (The World Bank, 2005). In order to gain deeper insights into 
this phenomenon, respondents were enquired about the reasons for this slow implementation. 
It was found that in Kenya and Pakistan, the main hindrance in implementation of CG reforms 
stems from the business community. CG is seemingly still viewed as a foreign standard that 
has little relevance to highly concentrated corporate sector in Kenya and Pakistan, because 
majority of business are family-owned and controlled. Hence practitioner account suggests 
although CG regulations may be suitable in the contexts where they were originally developed, 
they are not perceived relevant in the context where they are applied (Adegbite and Nakajima, 
2012, Siddiqui, 2010, Rashid, 2011). A CFO from Pakistan insisted; 
“Because of the family structure… how can they go for corporate setup? Hiring of qualified 
people, hiring of diversified people, giving them a…good remuneration and spending too much 
money on financial reports? So, they don’t care about it” (CG1PAK, Pakistan) 
Practitioner account so far suggest the institutional context in these countries evidences 
divergence of local institutional characteristics at Level 1 of Williamson framework, while the 
basis upon which Anglo-American CG model is founded is depicted in Level 3. Majority of 
the respondents in Pakistan and Kenya noted that CG requirements regarding disclosures and 
board independence at Level 3 are intrusion to otherwise closely-held family/ethnic culture at 
Level 1 (see also, Kimani et al., 2015). 
CG in Cameroon was also recognised to have developed under foreign influence, rather 
than having emerged locally, to meet institutional requirements of the country. As suggested 
by both DiMaggio and Powell (1983) & Williamson (1998), conformity with borrowed 
international prescribed best practices in CG through regulations is a function of external and 
institutional dependencies.  Comparatively, Cameroon ranks poorly among the three countries 
when it comes to CG implementation due to the fact the sensitisation process in the country is 
very slow. This slow sensitisation process has adverse effects on the implementation of CG 
and subsequent accountability. When asked why the process of CG in Cameroon was slow, a 
CEO stated; 
“In Cameroon…I think we still have quite some distance to cover… the issue is not writing a 
code, it’s not coming out with procedures, it’s a question of mentality, in Cameroon, there are 
many things that are wonderfully written but they must be enforced” (CG2CAM, Cameroon).  
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Another respondent shared similar views but went further to opine that the CG process 
and implementation in Cameroon is characterised by lack of accountability. 
“You have lack of accountability, responsibility, and transparency so basically the key pillars 
within CG are lacking… I think we are at infancy stage … some organisations are well 
advanced but if you take everything as a whole, as a country, we are still at infancy” 
(CG7CAM, Cameroon). 
This opinion by the latter excerpt was echoed by majority of respondents in Cameroon. 
These suggest that the underlying social (normative) structures constrain the actions of CG 
practitioners as they are constrained by a mentality of lack of accountability and the inability 
for regulators to enforce enacted laws. This is consistent with the high level of corruption in 
the country that perpetuates unwillingness towards accountability and transparency. Thus, from 
Williamson (1998) NIE framework, governance reforms (Level 3) are not introduced in 
alignment with institutional environment (Level 1), while at Level 2, there is weakness in legal 
and political institutions due to high corruption practices, consequently leading to 
ineffectiveness in implementation of governance institutions in Cameroon.  This lack of 
implementation may also be due to colonial legacy of the country. Specifically, common law 
traditions are practiced in the English-speaking areas with emphasises on accountability. On 
the other hand, civil law is practiced in French areas which is characterised by inefficiency and 
‘laiser faire’ practices that promotes corruption practices (Gauthier and Zeufack, 2010). These 
institutional differences in both areas of Cameroon has generated institutional forces that 
constrains and determine the way firms operate and their consequent CG practices. Therefore, 
following Williamson NIE conceptualisation (see table 1), any governance regulation that does 
not adapt to this institutional peculiarity may be ineffective.    
A comparison of CG in Cameroon with that in Kenya and Pakistan reveals that Pakistan 
and Kenya are following an Anglo-Saxon model of CG, both are common law countries and 
the guidelines of CG were issued in both countries in 2002. The capital market in both countries 
reflects a majority of family-owned companies. In addition, both countries have developed CG 
codes to guide firm practices. Cameroon, in contrast follows a mix of Anglo-American and 
Continental Europe CG models (a blend also known as Anglo- French model of CG). Although 
OHADA in Cameroon provides the basic CG framework for corporate organisations, however, 
the respondents indicated the need for and lack of a separate CG code. 
“…The OHADA to a large extent covers some of the issues…I think that having had the 
OHADA law in place, there could have been a document for CG, which now takes what 
OHADA has not addressed, it is addressed in CG for Cameroon” (CG6CAM, Cameroon). 
This suggests that in Cameroon, there is a lack of initiative from regulatory bodies with 
regards to an effective implementation of CG regulations. It might be inferred from the above 
discussions and the evidence provided in table 2 that, the governments of these countries have 
adopted CG regulations under the influence of international organisations, and the regulatory 
bodies especially in Kenya and Pakistan are attempting to ensure compliance with governance 
regulations. However, the business organisations in these counties are now adapting their CG 
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structures under coercive pressures of the regulatory bodies (see also Areneke and Kimani, 
2018). 
These findings support the assumptions of new institutional sociology where countries 
adopt certain regulations in anticipation of developmental aid and benefits (DiMaggio & 
Powel, 1983, p.150-152). More so, the resistance and or lack of willingness to implement 
thereof is due to lack of alignment and adaptation with informal institutions such as culture and 
religion which has powerful influences in Kenya and Pakistan [at the institutional environment 
(Level 1) and governance institutions level (Level 3)]. These regulations have negative 
implications as they result in creation of a conflict in family-owned and controlled enterprises 
prevailing in developing countries, where family owners show reluctance in adopting 
recommended practices. While in Cameroon, there is a lack of alignment across Levels 1, 2 3 
institutions. Consequently, various CG practitioners do not see the value of CG, which renders 
the implementation efforts ineffective.     
5.2 Regulatory compliance 
Some scholars have argued for government intervention and regulation for effective CG 
(Mullineux, 2006, Elmagrhi, et al., 2016).  Table 3 provides evidence from all the three 
countries, regarding CG practitioners’ perceptions about the level of compliance with CG 
regulations. 
[Insert Table 3 here: Strict regulatory compliance] 
 
The responses from all countries revealed that firms in these countries attempt to comply with 
CG only because it is a regulatory requirement. In Cameroon, all firms are compelled to follow 
the OHADA CG guidelines, while banks are required to adhere to the OHADA and industry 
regulator guideline, which is the COBAC. However, in addition to the OHADA, multi-
nationals also implement other CG guidelines especially those from the country of the parent 
company. In addition, some firms supplement the OHADA CG guidelines with the tenant board 
law of 1999.  A respondent reports the latter;  
“We have the OHADA; we have the guidelines which are those instruments the tenant board 
has put in place as in the 1999 law” (CG2CAM, Cameroon). 
Based on the evidence from practitioner’s feedback, CG does not have a push or drive 
of its own in Cameroon, as most of the CG guidelines can only be found within general 
company laws. Director’s accounts also testify that CG is intertwined with general laws and 
industry regulations as such company executives are obliged to implement those guidelines. 
As discussed in section 5.1 there is a lack of initiative from regulatory bodies towards the 
development of stringent CG regulations. Furthermore, it is evident that CG lacks institutional 
identity in Cameroon and as such regulatory guidelines act as a support to CG. Consequently, 
regulatory enforcement is the key driver of CG adoption in Cameroon without which majority 
of firms might not comply with international CG practices. High levels of corruption in 
Cameroon might also be responsible for development of a negative perception concerning the 
effectiveness of CG. These findings are consistent with the findings of the World Bank report 
(2006) and GIZ reports (2013) that up to 78% of firms in Cameroon believe corruption is a 
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serious issue affecting good CG practices in the country. This situation indicates a weakness in 
Level 2 institutions in the country. Since Level 3 (governance institutions) are not in alignment 
with Level 2 (institutional environment), we contend that Level 3 institutions becomes 
ineffective in the context of Cameroon resulting in poor compliance with CG guidelines.  
However, the evidence from Kenya shows strict CG regulation was introduced by 
regulatory authorities. 
“It is better if government intervenes in enforcing CG adoption…regulation is a sure way of 
ensuring a level playing field” (CG5KEN, Kenya). 
Practitioners commonly noted that the active regulation of the corporate sector has led 
to increased adoption of CG within organizations. While linking CG compliance levels to 
regulatory enforcement, practitioners summed up that, firms are obligated to conform to certain 
standards to avoid the hefty fines and penalties that non-compliance attracts. Like Cameroon, 
the statement above suggests that enforcement is the greatest driver of CG uptake adoption 
without which majority of firms might not comply with governance guidelines. 
Evidence from Pakistan also suggest that the regulatory body ensured strict compliance 
with CG regulations. For example, firms coerced to adopt recommended governance practices 
as the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan is perceived to be a very strict regulator 
and non- compliance can result in imposition of heavy penalties. Also, for listed organisations, 
they are required to comply with the code of CG introduced by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan as a listing requirement. Practitioners strongly insisted that their 
respective institutions were complying with governance regulations. 
“I think that we are very rigorously following all the requirements of corporate governance” 
(CG3PAK, Pakistan). 
The practitioners were unanimous in their opinion that; it was not only their 
organization that was complying with these regulations; most listed firms operating in Pakistan 
are complying with governance regulations. 
“I think, every…every…company in Pakistan, they are compliant…with these regulations” 
(CG5PAK, Pakistan). 
This implies most of the firms in Pakistan and Kenya comply with CG regulations. In 
Cameroon, however, regulatory bodies have shown a lack of sufficient initiative to develop 
stringent CG regulations so far and company law serves as the main document outlining basic 
CG guidelines.  
As suggested by Williamson’s (1998) theocratical framework, close alignment between 
Level 2 and Level 3 institutions may result in a smooth implementation and adoption of CG 
regulations by CG practitioners. However, in contexts where there is lack of alignment with 
institutional environment (Level 1), CG practitioners resist implementation of ‘foreign’ 
governance mechanisms (Level 3). Therefore, a strong regulatory scrutiny (Level 2) coupled 
with threats for penalisation may assist in implementation of governance regulations. Our 
findings have important policy implications, especially in the context of Cameroon. We suggest 
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for introduction of a stringent regulatory framework for CG. We also contend that strong Level 
2 institutions and reduction in corruption practices can help in bridging the gap between Level 
1 and Level 3 institutions.     
5.3 Corporate governance’s impact on firm performance 
Some evidence from the literature suggests that there is a positive link between CG and 
firm performance (Gompers et al., 2003, Collins G Ntim 2013, Collins G. Ntim 2013a, Collins 
G. Ntim 2013b). However, as noted in section three, the outcome of such research has also 
often generated conflicting empirical results (Kumar and Zattoni 2015, McNulty et al. 2013). 
Drawing on these mixed findings, we asked practitioners about the effectiveness of CG 
regulations in improving the performance of firms. Practitioner accounts reveal similar mixed 
link between effective governance and performance of firms.  Specifically, there was 
significant variation in the opinions of practitioners across the three countries in this regard. 
Table 4 provides a few instances of evidence from the three countries.  
[Insert Table 4 here: Impact of corporate governance on firm performance is mix] 
In Kenya, the respondents shared diverse opinions regarding the perceived value of CG 
on performance, implying that CG is still a contested issue. Whilst no respondent suggested 
negative association between CG and performance, deeper discussions showed perceived 
impact of CG on performance ranging from a strong and direct to neutral link. 
“…CG brings proper structures that are necessary for proper running of the firm, with 
accruing benefits following later…if we have two firms where one adheres to good CG and 
another lacks proper CG structures, the former will have consistent performance while the 
latter will show a very erratic performance…” (CG5KEN, Kenya).  
This statement reflects the view amongst a section of practitioners that CG helps to not 
only improve performance but also achieve sustainable growth. The actual impact of CG on 
performance was cited as more visible in the long run rather than instantaneous. For instance, 
practitioners opined good CG enables the firm to manage performance through ‘bad times’, 
while those without proper CG structures stand to report decent performance only during good 
economic conditions. Further reflection on the link between CG and performance shows CG 
as a guarantee to shareholders of consistency of returns from their investments. 
To buttress this point, a governance actor in Kenya stated; 
“…there is a very strong link between CG and performance…CG is a check on a number of 
factors that can hamper performance if not restrained like conflict of interest, insider lending, 
and misappropriation of…assets…” (CG6KEN, Kenya). 
These practitioners appreciated the value relevance of CG in improving performance and long-
term survival of institutions. 
Nonetheless, contrary views emerged where some practitioners narrated no direct link 
between CG and performance (see Table 4). The lack of direct link may arguably indicate that 
the influence of CG on performance is more visible in the longer-term rather than short- term. 
These group of practitioners seemed to agree that good CG within firms is necessary, as it has 
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been glorified as a ‘magic touch’ to business success, in an attempt to make it appealing to 
managers. 
During discussion, governance actor CG3KEN claimed that CG needs maturity in the 
long-run for it to have a direct link to performance.  
“CG and performance have a negligible link…CG as a driver of performance? I would call it 
a constant that is on the far-end of the performance equation…the contributing effect is 
minimal…it’s a negligible constant   in the current environment (CG3KEN).” 
Although, according to Williamson (1998) NIE framework, effective implementation 
of governance at Level 3 eventually translates into attainment of improved organisational 
outcomes, however, all research participants did not seem to agree with this view. As narrated, 
most of the firms continue to report increased profitability in Kenya, however they do not 
attribute this profitability to adoption of good governance practices. This indicates that 
adopting good governance practices may is not considered a priority within some firms since 
they still report good performance, thus lacking motivation to voluntarily embrace CG beyond 
the threshold required under the law.  
In Cameroon, although all the directors agreed that CG affects the performance of firms, 
there is divergence in the direction of the effect. For example, a practitioner opined that: 
“The board functions in my opinion have a positive effect on our company performance and I 
think this is really essential otherwise there is no need for a board” (CG8CAM, Cameroon). 
The above CG practitioner linked board functionality to a positive firm performance. 
However, practitioner CG2CAM hinted that it is the representation of directors from various 
ministries, which helps link the firm to important government agencies, which enhances a 
positive firm performance. However, other practitioners opine a negative relationship between 
CG and firm performance. For example, practitioner CG1CAM (see Table 4) illustrates an 
example where board members who represent the major shareholder (who constitute majority 
of the board) made a decision to issue out loans to customers related to majority shareholder 
without due diligence of the credit worthiness of the customer (against advice of management 
and minority shareholder representatives. The non-repayment of these loans has become a 
serious problem to the organisation’s survival thus impacting negatively on its performance. 
The latter practitioner’s evidence suggests a divergence of local institutional characteristics 
from the basis upon which Anglo-American CG model is premised. This is a shift from agency 
theory’s postulation of conflict between principals and agents. Instead, the evidence above 
points to a multidimensional problem, that is, principal-principal conflicts between minority 
and majority shareholders where the latter abuse the rights of the former (Yusuf et al., 
Forthcoming). In addition, there are also agent-shareholder conflicts where managers view 
shareholders as not acting in the best interests of the long-term success of firm. For example, 
majority shareholders were found in the case of Cameroon to control the issuing of loans 
without due diligence of the credit worthiness of loan applicants. These types of conflicts are 
seen to be prevailing within developing countries with weak and ineffective legal and 
regulatory control mechanisms. As such, majority shareowners through familial shareholding 
might exploit minority shareholders and managers of firms.  
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The view of negative performance was echoed by another director in Cameroon, who 
reported that the board is a legal creation and thus only plays the role of approving budgets and 
checking accounts as stipulated by law. In her opinion, the lack of critical and strategic 
orientation of the board affects the performance of the company negatively. This finding is 
inconsistent with existing literature which suggests that CG guides boards of directors towards 
being professionally competent (Liew, 2008). Similar to Kenya, some directors also reported a 
neutral influence of CG on the performance of firms in Cameroon (see table 4). 
In Pakistan, practitioner CG1PAK opined that compliance with CG has played an 
important role in making organizations profitable. He insisted that, owing to these regulations, 
Karachi Stock Exchange is among the best performing emerging economies stock exchanges 
in the world.  
“Yes…what these corporate governance guidelines have led to, is that, institutions have 
become more efficient, because they are led by efficient people…the profitability of the 
financial sector of Pakistan…is tremendous. It’s not because of just corporate governance, but 
corporate governance has had a very good role to play.” (CG1PAK, Pakistan). 
However, other CG practitioners thought that compliance with CG regulations does not 
play a significant role in making an organization profitable. Although compliance with these 
regulations was not perceived as a direct contributor to increasing profitability, non-
compliance, however, could result in poor financial performance. For banking firms, for 
example, penalties from the central bank in the case of non-compliance were perceived to be a 
contributor in reducing bank profits. 
“If you are making lots of profit, you are a profitable bank. On the other hand, your controls 
are weak, and the amount of penalty, for example, that is directly hitting your profitability” 
(CG2PAK, Pakistan). 
Practitioners indicated that firms were specifically concerned about their reputation. 
They highlighted this as negative externality as a result of non-compliance which could affect 
the firm’s profitability as it could negatively affect stakeholder’s perception of the firm 
(especially foreign investors).   
“Reputation risk comes into play in not following it. OK. If you don’t follow it, then there’s 
large reputation risk. So, if you are not following corporate governance there is a huge 
reputation and market risk.” (CG4PAK, Pakistan) 
Most of the practitioners opined that some of the CG code’s provisions were 
unnecessarily increasing firm’s costs, which reduces profitability. 
“They have to go for somebody who is experienced person and maybe that has a higher cost. 
Holding of meetings by the board of directors also have high cost, establishing a separate, full-
fledged company secretariat department, which is ensuring all the compliances. These things 
all involve people; it involves developing a process. So, all these things have a cost.” (CGB4, 
Pakistan). 
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Practitioners do not perceive compliance with CG as necessary to improve profitability 
of firms. Rather ‘compliance with CG’ and ‘running the business properly’ to earn maximum 
profits are perceived as separate goals for the board. 
“One has to walk on the both dimensions. Because you have to be compliant as well as you 
have to go for your efforts...you know, to secure the business in a proper way.” (CG3PAK, 
Pakistan). 
The practitioner disagreed with the idea that CG plays a role in making a firm profitable. 
Rather, the profitability of any institution is perceived to be associated with various ‘other’ 
factors. Similarly, another practitioner stressed that the profitability of a firm depends more on 
the business model adopted. 
“As far as the profitability is concerned...I would say it...depends on the business model of...and 
more on its...way of doing business.” (CG5PAK, Pakistan). 
Overall, some evidence from CG practitioners in the three countries indicates some 
positive relationship between CG and firm performance. However, the overwhelming evidence 
from all three countries indicates that practitioners do not anticipate any explicit benefits of CG 
compliance in terms of improved profitability. Thus, firms follow regulations only if there is 
strict regulatory compliance enforcement. 
We contend that although the implementation of ‘foreign’ CG regulations may not be 
viewed favourably by CG practitioners across the three counties, differences in the way these 
regulations were introduced have resulted in creation of significant different CG cultures in 
these countries. As Williamson (1998) suggested, institutions at each level of NIE framework 
can influence each other. We find the presence of coercive isomorphic pressures from the 
regulatory bodies in Pakistan and Kenya, towards implementation of recommended 
governance practices does not necessarily result in improved firm performance and efficiency. 
Consequently, companies in these countries are complying with CG mainly due to threats of 
penalisation. We argue this coercive implementation of CG at Level 3 may result in 
development of CG culture in these countries in the long run, eventually improving Level 1 
institutions (a potential improvement). The case of Cameroon is however different. A lack of 
commitment from regulatory bodies, and a reluctance from practitioners to adopt good CG 
practices may result in poor CG implementation and subsequently weak compliance in the 
country in the long run. This may lead to slow development of good CG practices which is 
detrimental to the countries aim of becoming a middle-income economy by 2035 (MINEPAT, 
2009, Cameroon Vision 2035, 2009, pp.46).  
6.0 Summary and conclusion 
6.1. Summary of findings 
There has been little academic attention to date concerning the nature of CG practices 
prevailing within emerging economies contexts. In addition, the few studies conducted within 
emerging economies contexts have either been mainly quantitative in nature, or country 
specific, or employed theoretical lenses that do not reflect institutional realities of emerging 
economies. This study has filled this lacuna by exploring the perceptions of CG practitioners 
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in implementing CG practices within three emerging economies with some similar corporate 
sector architectures but with varied institutional environments. Drawing upon a critical realist 
stance and grounded on new institutional economics theory, we explored the perception of CG 
practitioners through semi-structured interviews in relation to CG implementation process, 
regulatory compliance and the impact of CG on firm performance in Cameroon, Kenya and 
Pakistan. 
In relation to CG implementation process, practitioners’ accounts indicate that CG 
implementation is still very slow across the three countries. All there is general reluctance to 
adhere and implement “good” CG. Practitioners opined that this is because CG did not emanate 
locally. Rather, it came about because of foreign pressures from international bodies rather than 
locally-driven initiatives. Furthermore, evidence showed that the slow implementation process 
in these countries is because local institutional environments prevalent in these countries differs 
from the basis upon which the adopted western CG models were developed. This finding is 
consistent with the new institutional theory premise. For example, due to concentrated 
ownership in these countries, there is a shift from agency theory’s principal-agent conflict to 
principal-principal conflict, as well as agent-principal conflict. This finding is consistent with 
Young et al. (2008) and (Morck et al. 2004) who opine that in emerging economies 
characterised with concentrated ownership structures and absence of external CG mechanisms 
to protect minority shareholders, the prevalent type of conflict is more of a principal-principal 
conflict rather than agent-principal conflict as agency theory postulates. 
More so, with regards to regulatory compliance, practitioner accounts revealed that 
firms across the three countries comply with CG provisions not because of the importance or 
relevant of CG. Rather, it is driven by that fact it is part of the law. While in Cameroon CG 
regulation is not strictly enforced as regulatory bodies have shown a lack of initiative to develop 
stringent regulations; in Kenya and Pakistan however, firms adhere to CG to avoid hefty 
financial fines and penalty for non-compliance. However, evidence from the research data does 
not support the presence of normative or mimetic tendencies as practitioners showed little 
enthusiasm towards complying with perceived “good” CG practices. 
Finally, with regards to the impact of CG on firm performance, whilst some CG 
practitioners from Kenya indicated that CG impacts on firm performance, others indicated that 
there is no direct link between CG and firm performance. Similarly, in Cameroon, some 
practitioners accepted that good CG impact on firm performance positively, while others 
opined a negative and neutral relationships. Practitioners who opined negative relationship 
gave instances of majority shareholder manipulation of the board to take decisions, which were 
considered unfavourable to minority shareholders and threatens the long-term survival of the 
firm. Like Cameroon, practitioners from Pakistan indicated both positive and negative 
relationship between CG and firm performance. Those who opined a negative relationship gave 
reasons associated with the costly nature of complying with CG provisions. Hence, these mixed 
opinions by CG practitioners to a large extent supports the presence of coercive isomorphic 
pressures to implement CG provisions, from regulatory bodies in Kenya and Pakistan. The 
results indicate that CG is yet to be fully integrated within the business culture and corporate 
structures in emerging economies, which suggest the need to consider a review of existing CG 
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regulations to identify areas of misalignment and make necessary optimization that will ensure 
increased implementation by firms.  
We observe that the governments across these emerging economies have implemented 
CG guidelines and firms within these countries are adapting to them under coercive influence. 
However, as these regulations are complied with only to meet regulatory requirements, they 
are not effective in ensuring good governance. The results of this study support single country 
findings within extant literature which shows that some of the CG regulations implemented 
within emerging economies are not in alignment with the institutional contexts prevailing in 
these economies (e.g. Okike, 2007; Wanyama et al., 2009; Adegbite and Nakajima, 2012; 
Adegbite et al., 2013; Waweru, 2014, Kimani et al., 2015). Accordingly, the lack of alignment 
results in slow implementation of CG regulations. As these regulations do not emerge from 
within the institutional environments of these countries, firms comply with them only under a 
strict regulatory control. 
Drawings from the highlighted findings, our research makes significant contributions 
to existing literature on CG through a comparative analysis of CG practices across three 
emerging economies. The evidence indicates that existing institutional environments in these 
countries has a deep influence on the process of CG implementation, regulations and the impact 
of CG on firm performance. Furthermore, the research provides evidence against existing 
literature on convergence of CG, as we document that firms are adopting CG only under 
coercive pressures from regulatory bodies. This thus raises serious questions about “copy and 
paste” of CG practices from developed economies in emerging economies with different 
institutional realities. 
We contend that borrowed western CG regulations recommended by international 
agencies via national regulatory regimes are not suitable in emerging economies except where 
there is adaptation of such CG regulations to local institutional realities. Therefore, regulatory 
authorities need to take cognisance of these challenges and adapt CG regulations in accordance 
with institutional realities in forthcoming revisions of national CG codes. For example, policy 
makers can learn from South Africa King reports (from King I to current King IV) which has 
been adapted to capture corporate citizenship behaviour peculiar to the country (e.g. black 
economic empowerment regulations). 
6.2. Limitations and areas for further research 
The readers of this paper should bear a few issues in mind that may affect the interpretation of 
findings reported. First, our analysis concentrated on just three CG themes, that is, CG 
implementation, regulatory compliance and firm performance. We thus recommend future 
studies to expand the present paper’s analytical focus by examining how various other CG 
constructs, such as, board composition, board roles, or committee functions are impacted by 
institutional environments prevailing within emerging economies. Future studies may also 
benefit from incorporating wider variety of qualitative data, possibly by conducting focus 
group interviews with CG practitioners or adopting case study research design. Third, the 
findings from this paper may not be generalizable to other emerging economies contexts with 
potentially dissimilar institutional environments. In this regard, future studies may attempt to 
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carry out a mixed method study that incorporates quantitative and qualitative approaches with 
a view to enhance the generalisability of findings. 
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List of Tables 
Table 1: Economics of institutions: Adaptation of the framework for Cameroon, Kenya and Pakistan. 
 
 
 Level Duration / 
Frequenc
y (years) 
Purpose NIE Framework for Cameroon, Kenya and Pakistan. 
L1 Embeddedness: 
Informal institutions, customs, 
traditions, norms, religion 
100 to 
1000 
Often non-
calculative, 
spontaneous 
Strong informal institutional set-up. Strong belief systems exist about religious 
and family/tribal values in all three countries. 
L2 Institutional environment: 
Formal rules of the game – 
especially property (polity, 
judiciary, bureaucracy) 
10 to 100 Get the institutional 
environment right. 
1st order 
economizing 
Shaped under the influence of British institutional system in Pakistan and 
Kenya, while Cameroon’s institutional environment is shaped under a distinct 
Anglo-French influence. Lack of alignment with L1 institutions, that is, 
conflicts existed between local values of these countries and the value systems 
introduced by their colonisers.   
L3 Governance: 
Play of the game –esp. Contract 
(aligning governance structures with 
transactions) 
1 to 10 Get the governance 
structure right 
2nd order 
economizing 
At this level, corporate governance regulations in these three countries were 
introduced. These regulations were introduced at the directives of international 
bodies and might be in clash with local values and customs, unless adapted 
appropriately.  
L4 Resource allocation and 
employment (prices and quantities, 
incentive alignment) 
Continuou
s 
Get the marginal 
conditions right: 
3rd order 
economizing 
Effective functioning of capital market/ corporations is possible only after the 
adaptation and strengthening of L2 and L3 institutions. This level points to 
performance and efficiency of capital market. 
Source: Adapted from Williamson, (1998), p. 26 
   
 
32 
 
Table 2: Corporate Governance is a Foreign Concept 
 Responses Interpretation 
Kenya CG is still seen as a foreign concept that is less appreciated …if you look at some of the family- 
owned banks around, telling them to bring outside directors’ makes them anxious of losing 
control  of a business they have built from scratch (CG5KEN). 
Family firms don’t approve it 
Although CG has been around for almost a decade now, it is still a relatively new concept to 
many companies in Kenya (CG1KEN). 
10 years of implementation 
and still considered foreign 
Pakistan I think these are influenced by the IMF or Basel etc. There is no doubt about that…but they 
have to be customised, according to our own situation...If these are customised according to our 
traditions then there will be benefit. They will be more effective. (CG2PAK) 
Implemented under the 
influence of international 
funding organizations 
 You never implement any rule as it has been implemented in…in the London market, or US 
market, you cannot. Right. But what you have to do is that you have to adapt it...you have to 
restructure it in line with our own environment and things. (CG3PAK). 
Foreign Regulation 
Cameroon “The CG guidelines we tend to follow are the basic regulatory requirements as per the 
recommendations in OHADA and then of course we have the recommendations of the regulators 
(COBAC), so those two are the guiding principles, we are a local entity, and CG did not 
emanate from this environment…” (CG1CAM). 
Corporate Governance did 
not originate from 
institutional environment of 
Cameroon 
 “We apply UK CG laws to help determine what the company does” (CG8CAM). Corporate Governance 
regulations are foreign laws 
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Table 3: Strict Regulatory Compliance 
 Responses Interpretation 
Kenya …the regulator is strict, they have set rules of the game. If you’re required to do something and you 
fail, there is a penalty, and it is not small money, usually to the extent of half-a-million shillings, and 
sometimes a million shillings…(CG4KEN). 
Strict regulatory 
compliance 
…why set up additional departments or hire extra outside directors to be just sitting and taking 
allowances? These are avoidable costs that people would do anything to prevent…if you remove the 
regulatory push, this bandwagon will slow down because it has cost implications (CG3KEN). 
Strict regulatory 
compliance 
Pakistan Since it  is  compulsory  for  every listed company to  follow…nobody  has  an option  but to  follow   it. 
(CG4PAK). 
Strict regulatory 
compliance 
Since the regulator demands it and checks its compliance, so they have to…they may not be happy with 
these regulations at the same time. And they have to...comply with them because of the requirement   of 
the regulator. (CG5PAK). 
Strict regulatory 
compliance 
Cameroon “We  adhere to CG in both UK and OHADA in Cameroon. It is more stringent to do it from both 
sides…” (CG8CAM). 
Strict regulatory 
compliance 
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Table 4: Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
 Responses Interpretation 
Kenya …some banks don’t follow proper CG structures but they still perform well… (CG2KEN). No 
relationship 
…CG and performance have a negligible link…CG as a driver of performance? I would call it a constant t h a t  
is on the far-end of the performance equation…the contributing effect is minimal…it’s a negligible constant   in 
the current environment (CG3KEN). 
Negligible link 
Pakistan Compliance...it indirectly adds to the profitability of course...indirectly. But if…someone says that…that by 
complying, we will be automatically very profitable, that’s not the case. (CG3PAK) 
Indirect 
relationship 
 Since board of directors…the tone from the top is to earn maximum profitability… they do sometimes give a free 
hand to the management and supress those functions who are basically responsible for a good   governance...to 
fetch maximum profits. (CG5PAK) 
Negative 
relationship 
Cameroon “ … the board has been existing for the past years but today, the non-performing loans of the corporation is so 
disproportionate… there are many files(loans) that the board definitely approve that are nonperforming  today, 
it would be in my own situation the board acts negatively, impacts negatively on the life of the corporation” 
(CG1CAM). 
Negative 
relationship 
 “Board members are not actually executive management so in no way do they actually influence the day to  day 
management…they set up the strategy that is passed on to the executive management and the executive 
management now have to implement the strategy …that is what influences performance” (CG3CAM) 
No 
Relationship 
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Appendix1: Profile of the Interview Participants 
Interviewee Current Position Qualifications Experience Gender 
Cameroon 
CG1CAM CEO Bachelor’s Degree 23 Years Male 
CG2CAM CEO Master’s Degree 25 Years Male 
CG3CAM Executive Director Audit and Internal Control Bachelor’s Degree/IFA 24 Years Male 
CG4CAM CEO Master’s Degree 25Years Male 
CG5CAM CEO and Chairman Master’s Degree 28 years Male 
CG6CAM Finance Director Bachelor’s Degree 21Years Female 
CG8CAM Executive Director Master’s Degree 14Year Male 
Kenya 
CG1KEN Company Secretary Bachelor’s degree 7 Years Female 
CG2KEN CEO Master’s degree/ Certified Public Accountant 5 years Male 
CG3KEN Head of Internal Audit Master’s degree/ ACCA/Certified Fraud Examiner 8 years Male 
CG4KEN Head of Finance Master’s degree/ CPA/Certified Information Systems 
Auditor 
12 years Male 
CG5KEN Head of Internal Control Bachelor’s degree/Certified Public Accountant 6 years Male 
CG6KEN CEO Doctorate degree 13 years Male 
CG7KEN Finance and Investor Relations Manager Master’s degree 10 years Male 
CG8KEN Finance Director Master’s degree/Certified Public Accountant 8 years Male 
Pakistan 
CG1PAK Compliance Director Master’s degree Chartered Accountant 34 years Male 
CG2PAK General Manager Compliance Master’s degree 20 years Male 
CG3PAK Head of Compliance and Training Masters Certified Internal Auditor 18 years Male 
CG4PAK Head Credit Risk Department Chartered Accountant 11 years Male 
CG5PAK Head of Compliance Division Masters Certified Internal Auditor 5 years Female 
CG6PAK Head of Internal Control Chartered Accountant 5 years Male 
CG7PAK Company Secretary Master’s degree Associate member of the Institute of the 
Corporate Secretaries of Pakistan 
13 years Male 
CG8PAK Company Secretary Bachelor’s degree Fellow of the Institute of the   Corporate 
Secretaries of Pakistan 
15 years Male 
